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9Laws to Authorize Wiretapping, “Juki Net,” and Other Legislation in 1999
 The late Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi was known as a good-natured fellow with little 
ego and few enemies.  He was famously skewered by a foreign political analyst who wrote 
that he had “all the pizzazz of a cold pizza.”  Obuchi was so self-effacing that he was openly 
referred to as a mediocrity and was prone to make statements such as “I don’t have any ideas, 
so there’s nothing to clash about,” when asked if he had any disputes with other political lead-
ers.1  But when he was done, the record would show that the government led by the mild-man-
nered Obuchi had compiled a list of achievements of which the most ambitious leader could 
be proud.  In power for less than two years, the Obuchi government achieved several historic 
legislative breakthroughs that had been sought by leaders of the country’s dominant Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) for decades.2
 Japan’s national parliament (Diet) passed four separate highly contentious national laws 
under Obuchi in 1999, including Japan’s first wiretapping law, a law mandating a citizen 
numbering system, a law expanding the operations of the Self-Defense Forces, and even legal 
recognition for Japan’s pre-war flag and national anthem.  In light of these achievements, it is 
hard to disagree with the summation of one observer who said “1999 is the year that the shape 
 1 See, e.g., “Keizo Obuchi, Japan’s ‘Mr Ordinary’, died on May 14th, aged 62,” The Economist (US), May 
20, 2000.
 2 By contrast, Obuchi`s predecessor as Prime Minister, Ryutaro Hashimoto, projected the image of a strong 
national leader, whether he was clothed in a business suit or hakama.  All Japanese had seen pictures of 
the vigorous Hashimoto in full kendo regalia, attacking an opponent with a ferocious overhead stroke. 
The defiant pose he struck while standing up to the Americans in ongoing negotiations over contentious 
market access, defense and other issues, was a source of national pride.
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 From the time of the founding of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party in 1955 until the 
present, its leaders have worked consistently to undermine the individual rights protec-
tions of the 1947 Constitution, especially protections for freedom of speech and of the 
press. 
 The various positions taken by party leaders during a legislative battle early in the 
21st century showcase some of the key themes of the LDP approach toward speech regula-
tion:  increased government control over the news media, punishment for publishers who 
criticize the nation’s leaders, and increased surveillance over the general population.  
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of this country changed.”3
 Among the new statutes of 1999, the one of greatest symbolic importance formally re-
vived Japan’s most powerful nationalist symbols, the hinomaru (rising sun) flag and kimi ga 
yo anthem.4  Legal recognition of the Meiji-era flag and anthem had been on the conservative 
party agenda for decades, but due to the close association of these symbols with belief in the 
divinity of the emperor and Japan’s imperialist wars, party leaders had been unable to act. 
Now the time had come.  In order to reassure the country that this step did not signal an inten-
tion to return to the bad old days, Obuchi and other government spokespeople declared that, 
although the old symbols would now have legal recognition, they had no intention to make 
participation in anthem and flag ceremonies mandatory.5  The law was passed on Friday, Au-
gust 13 and took effect the same day.
 Another law of great symbolic importance – and even greater practical effect – had 
passed the day before.  This one, Japan’s first statute explicitly approving the use of wiretaps 
by law enforcement authorities, was stridently opposed by bar associations, law professors and 
liberal segments of the press.  At the helm of majorities in both houses of the Diet, the Obu-
chi Cabinet overrode these objections and widespread fear that wiretapping powers would be 
abused.6  In particular, press organizations had sought to gain an exemption from wiretapping 
for reporters – in the manner of lawyers, doctors and a limited number of other specialists – 
but failed.  So the new law provided police investigators the authority to listen in on conversa-
tions between news reporters and their sources. 
 The wiretapping law was not the only statute passed by the Diet in 1999 with the ob-
jective of enhancing police and military powers and enforcing discipline among the general 
population.7  Parallel to this expansion of domestic police power, new legislation also provided 
expanded authority for Japan’s Self-Defense Forces.  This would be one step in a progression 
that would lead to the dispatch of Self-Defense Forces to Iraq for a limited engagement under 
 3　Hiroshi Dai, Kōjin Jōhō Hogo Hō no Nerai (The Aim of the Personal Information Protection Law), 
(Ryokufu Publishing, 2001), p. 8, quoting Akao Hikarushi, a former editor of Shinbun Kenkyu, a monthly 
publication of the Japan Newspaper Association.
 4　Kimi ga yo was created to honor the Meiji Emperor and serve as a national anthem in the 1870s.  The lyr-
ics have their origin in a Heian-era waka poem recorded more than one thousand years ago.
 5　This task would be taken up by local governments, led by Tokyo prefecture.  On October 23, 2003 the 
Tokyo Education Department issued an order mandating specific details for flag-and-anthem ceremonies 
at public school ceremonies.  Hundreds of teachers have been punished for refusing to follow this order. 
The three panels of Japan’s Supreme Court issued a series of judgments in 2011 rejecting these teachers’ 
claims that they are protected by constitutional rights to freedom of thought and conscience.  For com-
ment on related lower court litigation, see Lawrence Repeta, “Politicians, Teachers and the Japanese 
Constitution: Flag, Freedom and the State,” at Japan Focus, http://japanfocus.org/products/details/2355.
 6　The failure of Japanese police authorities to prevent the 1995 Tokyo subway attack and other heinous 
crimes by the Aum Shinrikyo cult is sometimes cited as the immediate event driving the authorities to 
push for clear wiretapping authority.  Preliminary steps were first reported in the national media in 1996. 
The 1999 law was passed over the strident objections of the bar association, liberal law professors and 
some segments of the press.
 7　The Diet did pass an important open government law in 1999, Japan’s first national “information disclo-
sure law.”  Pressure from the news media, opposition parties, bar associations and small citizen groups 
like the “Citizens Movement for an Information Disclosure Law” provided the force needed to drive this 
open government law through the Diet.  For the story of this movement, see Lawrence Repeta, “Citizens: 
Founders of Japan’s Freedom of Information Movement,” Meiji Law Journal, Vol. 18, 39-68 (March, 
2011).  For additional details on the disclosure law, see note 73, infra, and accompanying text.
“Personal Information,” Media Control, and Government Power－Legislative Battles in Japan, 1999-2003　　11
the Koizumi government in 2004.
 Another controversial law with potentially far-ranging consequences passed the Diet on 
August 12, the same day as the wiretapping law.  This one authorized creation of the “Basic 
Residential Register Network” (jūmin kihon daichō nettowaaku) which, as we will see, would 
soon be generally known as “Juki Net.”  When it came into force three years later, this law 
created a national citizen numbering system to be employed as a locator for government docu-
ments.  It assigned an eleven-digit identification ID number to every Japanese citizen.  Like 
wiretapping powers, this was another measure long coveted by government officials.8  Without 
a universal identifier comparable to the US social security number, they undoubtedly had a 
hard time tracking documents concerning specific individuals through the administrative laby-
rinth.  
 But this law was opposed not only by the bar associations, the opposition parties and 
most of the press, but also by the LDP’s own coalition partner, the Komeito, as well.  Anyone 
could see that the new system would present a grand opportunity for wholesale abuse by hack-
ers, commercial interests happy to pay for confidential information concerning target clients 
and by government officials themselves.  In order to secure Komeito’s support, Obuchi prom-
ised to create new personal information protection legislation in order to guard against poten-
tial abuse of the new numbering system.9  Obuchi made his promise before a committee of the 
Diet in June 1999, announcing that the adoption of a personal information protection system to 
apply to both government and private organizations was a precondition (zentei) to operation of 
the citizen numbering system.10  Just as he had assuaged public fears by declaring that school 
teachers and others would not be ordered to participate in nationalist rituals against their wills, 
now he assured everyone that there would be adequate protection in place to insure that the 
new numbering system did not result in improper invasions of privacy.  To cement the point, 
appropriate language was included in the “supplementary provisions” to the law that passed 
the Diet.  
 This article will report on the extended legislative battle that would result from the at-
tempt to fulfill Obuchi’s “pre-condition.”  In particular, it will focus on the conflict between 
government proposals to apply information controls not only to government agencies and pri-
vate businesses, but also to the news media and other writers, thus presenting a serious threat 
to free speech.  The legislative battle spawned by Obuchi’s promise would not be resolved 
until long after he had left the scene.11  This is the story of the creation of Japan’s “Personal 
Information Protection” laws, a tale of sharp conflict between forces supporting freedom of 
speech and those in favor of expanded government power.   
 8　For decades, the national bureaucrats had been frustrated by this state of affairs.  They wanted a single 
identifier to track all government records concerning each citizen from cradle to grave.  But the opposi-
tion to this powerful tool was great, and it was led by none other than powerful ruling party politicians. 
With countless sources of dubious and illegal funding, the last thing successful politicians wanted was an 
effective system to enable tax investigators to efficiently track flows of funds.
 9　Yasuhiko Tajima, Human Rights and the Law Protecting Individual Information (個人情報保護法と人
権 Kojin Jōhō Hogohō to Jinken) (Akashi Shoten, 2002), at 114, citing Asahi Shimbun dated June 5, 1999.
10　Mainichi Shimbun (ed.), 個人情報は誰のものか Kojin jōhō wa dare no mono ka, (Who Owns Individual 
Information?) (Mainichi, 2002), at 60 (hereinafter “Mainichi book”).
11　Obuchi suffered a stroke on April 1, 2000 and was replaced as prime minister by Yoshiro Mori on April 
15.  Obuchi died on May 14, 2000. 
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Reigning in Aggressive Elements in Japan’s News Media
 Japan is surely one of the highest density media markets in the world.12  With five na-
tional daily newspapers each distributing several million copies per day, aggressive television 
news broadcasters and countless gossipy news weeklies and other raucous publications, com-
petition for the latest news on the story of the day is ferocious.  Whether it concerns the grue-
some slaying of a small child, the poisoning of neighbors at a village festival, fatal release of a 
poison gas at an ordinary apartment building, the shooting of a young woman on her Los An-
geles honeymoon or any other sensational event with the potential to latch on to the national 
imagination13, when Japan’s news executives select their target, the rush is on.  Suspects, vic-
tims, neighbors, relatives – anyone in position to add a new detail to the growing story – all are 
fair game.  
 Individuals at the center of the story can be besieged by battalions of reporters and cam-
eramen, each one desperate for a nugget of information to call his own.  The chaos of this satu-
ration coverage repeats each time a big, salacious story captures national headlines.  Innocent 
individuals can easily be convicted in the national imagination and their lives and the lives of 
the people around them can be seriously disrupted by the nuisance of the newsmen.  To de-
scribe this phenomenon, Japanese commentators have borrowed a term from the rugby field, 
“scrum.”  The hottest stories lead to news media “scrums” with central characters in the story 
pushed into the position of the ball at the bottom of the pile.    
 At the end of the 20th century in Japan, there was broad consensus that the media scrum 
were going too far and people were being unfairly victimized. It was frequently said that such 
aggressive reporting violated “human rights.”
 Something had to be done.  As Japan’s national parliament was occupied with such con-
tentious issues as the national anthem and flag, wiretapping, and citizen numbering, a small 
committee within the primary policy research organization of the Liberal Democratic Party, 
studied this problem of aggressive reporting and human rights.14  Labeled the “The Committee 
to Study the Balance between Reporting and Human Rights,” the group was chaired by a for-
mer Minister of Justice named Kazuho Tanikawa.15  It was launched on March 9, 1999.  The 
following day the LDP newsletter greeted the committee’s formation with headlines that read 
“Rescue from Injury Due to News Reporting” and “Prevent Injury from News Reporting.”16
12　For a concise description of Japan’s news industry, see Susan J. Pharr, “Introduction,” in Susan J. Pharr 
and Ellis Krauss, eds., Media and Politics in Japan, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996), pp. 3-9. 
For a more recent review of the structure and operation of Japan’s news media, see Laurie Anne Freeman, 
Closing the Shop; Information Cartels and Japan’s Mass Media (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2000).
13　These thumbnail descriptions concern actual stories that generated massive news coverage in the 1980s 
and 90s.
14　This institution, known as the “Public Affairs Research Council” (PARC), channels the ruling party’s 
policy agenda into the legislative process.  See, e.g., Minoru Nakano, “The changing legislative process 
in the transitional period,” in Japanese Politics Today: Beyond Karaoke Democracy?  Purnendra Jain and 
Takashi Inoguchi, eds., (London and Melbourne: Macmillan, 1997).
15　Mainichi book, pp. 62-63.  The Tanikawa committee was one of several internal LDP initiatives to track 
unfavorable media coverage and study means for controlling it.  See Tajima, supra n. 8, p. 14.  
16　Kodansha.cplaza.ne.jp/broadcast/special/2001_04_18_2/content.html.
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 The Tanikawa committee would hold ten hearings, calling witnesses from among media 
organizations and victims of excessive news media coverage. It worked fast, releasing its final 
report five months later on August 11, just a day before the Lower House of the Diet passed 
the wiretapping and citizen numbering laws.  The opening passage in the Committee’s final re-
port defined the problem to be solved.  “The influence of news reporting is very great,” its au-
thors declared. “Depending on how it is carried out, the risk of serious injury to human rights 
can also be great.”  The report cited two specific recent examples of media scrums: coverage 
of individuals who undergo organ transplants17 and dioxin contamination of vegetables grown 
in a Tokyo satellite community called Tokorozawa.
 The central section of the Committee’s report was divided into five sections, one ad-
dressed each to broadcast and print media, one to the need for a monitoring system with citizen 
participation, another addressed to the judiciary and finally, one that recognized that if volun-
tary measures did not solve the problem, new legislation would be required.  The report did 
recognize efforts at self-regulation and called for better education of reporters, but it conveyed 
the sense that this was not enough.  In the section on the judiciary, the report unambiguously 
called for an increase in damage payments to successful plaintiffs in libel litigation, declaring 
that executives in Japan publishing houses contemptuously dismissed libel suits as “million 
yen cases,” viewing court awards as a minor cost of doing business.  
 This final section called for the creation of new legal protections, including a privacy 
protection law and a human rights protection law.  This brief report, crafted by a small team of 
LDP operatives working behind closed doors, would set the agenda for a legislative battle that 
would roil the Diet and spill onto the front pages repeatedly over the next five years.
The True Agenda of the LDP’s Tanikawa Committee
 Of course, there was much that the report did not say.  
 From the time of its formation in 1955 through delivery of the Tanikawa Report in 1999, 
Japan had been ruled by the leaders of a single conservative political party with only one short 
break.  Comfortably placed in the seats of power, senior members of that party expect to enjoy 
the perquisites of political leadership, holding Cabinet positions of choice, setting the legisla-
tive agenda, and regularly collecting large financial contributions to their political campaigns 
along with other special favors.  To a large extent, the most senior positions had become he-
reditary.  For example, five of the six LDP prime ministers that served between 1996 and 2009 
were the sons or grandsons of prime ministers and other cabinet members.18  These men inher-
ited safe seats in the legislative districts of their fathers, succeeding in their first elections to 
parliament at a tender age.  Both Obuchi and his predecessor for example, were elected to take 
over their fathers’ districts at the age of 26.19 
17　Regarding complaints over aggressive reporting related to organ transplants and other cases, see the writ-
ings of Kenichi Asano, referenced at www1.doshisha.ac.jp/kasano/menu/profasano1.htm.  Accessed on 
September 1, 2007.
18　The sixth, Yoshiro Mori, is the son and grandson of mayors of his hometown in Ishikawa Prefecture. 
When the LDP returned to power in 2012 after a second interregnum, it was under the leadership of 
Shinzo Abe, grandson of Nobusuke Kishi, the primary founder of the LDP itself.
19　In Obuchi’s case, there was an interval of three years between his father’s death and his first election. 
During this interval, the family legislative seat was occupied by a member of the Socialist Party of Japan. 
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 For these lucky individuals, successful political careers are virtually guaranteed.  Op-
position parties have rarely posed a realistic threat to LDP control since the party was formed 
in 1955.  One of the few significant risks with the potential to upset this sweet program is 
scandal.  Should news reporters or gossip columnists get their hands on the details of extra-
marital affairs, improper financial conduct or other embarrassing events, a politician may be 
sufficiently damaged to be disqualified from the prime ministership and other senior offices. 
In extreme cases, he may find himself the defendant in a criminal trial.
 What the Tanikawa report did not say is that the committee’s most important mission was 
to come up with a program that would effectively insulate LDP leaders from the unwanted at-
tentions of investigative reporters.  At the time the committee was appointed in spring 1999, 
memories of the party’s temporary loss of power in 1992 (and subsequent devil’s bargain in 
which they agreed to a coalition with the Socialists20) were fresh.  Then the LDP’s loss of one-
fourth of its seats in the Upper House election of 1998 stoked fears that the party’s fortunes 
were in serious decline.  Repeated corruption scandals took their toll.  And with public dissat-
isfaction with government at a postwar high due to the long recession of the 1990s, the LDP 
hold on power was looking precarious.  It was the 1998 election disaster that drove Obuchi’s 
predecessor from office and led to his own elevation to the prime minister’s chair.
 An election for the all-powerful Lower House was expected in the summer of 2000 and 
party leaders were determined to hold onto control. To improve their chances, LDP politicians 
worked hard to create a new legal framework hemming in the nation’s news reporters and dis-
couraging their employers from publishing anything critical of LDP leaders.  The brief report 
of the Tanikawa committee outlined the main points of this program.  This was a sophisticated 
strategy, designed to rely on a series of new laws that would have the cumulative effect of 
limiting unfavorable press coverage.  As summarized by one writer, “None of these laws and 
ordinances directly seeks to bind the feet and hands (of the press) in the manner of the pre-war 
Peace Preservation Law.  The approach is more subtle, focused on techniques that may gain 
public opinion as an ally.”21 
 How could they “gain public opinion as an ally?”  Party leaders would have to convince 
people that their new policy was aimed at a completely different target, one of great impor-
tance to the voters themselves.  As it turned out, such a convincing threat to public order lay 
close at hand.
Leaks of Confidential Data
 It was easy to see that individuals who figured prominently in the news might be unfairly 
harassed by over-eager teams of news reporters.  But the absolute number of such victims, 
whether they were national politicians or ordinary people who had suffered some newsworthy 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gunma_3rd_district_%281947%E2%80%9393%29.
 Soon after his death in 2000, Gunma voters elected Obuchi’s daughter Yuko as his replacement.  Yuko 
would turn 27 that year.  In 2014, Japan’s news media bubbled over with the message that, having reached 
the age of 40, Yuko had become the first serious female candidate to be prime minister.
20　In order to return to power, in 1993 the LDP struck a deal with the Socialist Party that made the Socialist 
leader Tomiichi Murayama Prime Minister.
21　Dai, supra, n. 3, p. 8.
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calamity, was rather small.  Few people had actually experienced this form of “human rights 
violation.”  There was a related fear, however, experienced by every person who used a credit 
card, a bank account, a telephone or other communication device.
 All who considered the question seemed to agree that Japan needed new laws strengthen-
ing protection for personal information.  For most people, the need for confidentiality most 
obviously arises due to the potential for abuse posed by commercial organizations.  Numerous 
cases featuring the sale of private data had already been reported in the Japanese press in the 
1990s.  In one July 1999 case, for example, the Asahi reported that “At least ten insiders are 
exploiting the databases of the nation’s largest telephone and cellular companies in the lucra-
tive side business of selling confidential customers information over the Internet….The em-
ployees extract the information, including names, birthdates, addresses, bank account numbers, 
from the internal databases of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corp (NTT) and NTT Mobile 
Communications Network Inc. (NTT DoCoMo),” the sources said.  The personal informa-
tion is then sold to companies that offer the data over the Internet.22  In another 1999 case, the 
Asahi reported that an especially enterprising group “started selling personal information about 
patients’ medical conditions to medical and drug companies…The information includes each 
patient’s name, age, address and telephone number, together with a detailed description of the 
condition from which the person is suffering.  Afflictions appearing in the data include insom-
nia, high blood pressure, atopic dermatitis, hemorrhoids, uterine cancer, psychiatric disorders 
and cataracts.”  Sadly, the reports noted that company regulations prohibiting employees from 
leaking such information do not succeed in preventing such leaks.  In the case involving medi-
cal data, the Asahi quoted a source to say “The selling of this personal information is not ille-
gal and actually, some health product firms that are suffering from the economic downturn can 
benefit from our service.”23
 Obuchi’s pledge to establish a personal information protection law had arisen from the 
citizen numbering system and the need to protect people from abuse of information held by 
the government.  But he also recognized the threat to privacy interests posed by commercial 
entities in possession of massive databases of individual information, and declared that the law 
would apply to them as well.  
 Obuchi took the first important step to make good on this pledge by appointing Professor 
Masao Horibe to head a panel with the mission of devising such a law.  Horibe had served on 
the faculties of renowned public and private universities and was widely recognized as one of 
the nation’s leading experts on information law.24  Horibe was charged with proposing a new 
law to protect against potential abuse on both fronts, by government officials and commercial 
entities.
 As news accounts of thefts of personal information from commercial organizations con-
tinued, officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications were not shy about 
exploiting such events in their campaign to gather support for a personal information protec-
tion law.  For easy reference, the Ministry’s own website listed 23 cases involving the leak of 
22　“Insiders Selling NTT Customer Information,” Asahi Evening News, July 1, 1999.
23　“Patient Information Appears on Market,” Asahi Evening News, Dec. 1, 1999.
24　Horibe served most of his career on the faculty of Hitotsubashi University, a prestigious national univer-
sity.  In 1997, he reached the mandatory retirement age of 60 and took a position with Chuo University, 
one of Japan’s most renowned private universities.
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such private information in 2001 alone.25
 With cases like the above heavily reported in the daily press, privacy protection had be-
come a popular issue in Japan, and was becoming more so.  For example, the Cabinet office 
recently released the results of a public opinion survey on the topic.  In response to the ques-
tion: “do you think invasions of privacy have increased?”  62.7% of participants said yes.  To 
the question: “do you think such invasions will increase in the future,” 78.4% agreed.  Regard-
ing categories of information that individuals seek to keep confidential, 74.3%, the largest 
group, identified financial assets, including income, assets, and tax payments.26
 The risk of invasion of privacy by commercial organizations that amass huge databases 
filled with individual information was indeed great.  But this was a rather different issue from 
the risk of government abuse that was most directly presented by the citizen numbering sys-
tem.  As the process moved forward, these two very different problems would be mixed to-
gether and, at times it seemed, merged into one.
Drafting “Personal Information Protection” Laws 
 Nearly all of Japan’s national legislation is drafted by government bureaucrats rather than 
legislators.  The appointment of a blue ribbon committee charged with studying an important 
issue of public policy as a preliminary step is a well-established feature of Japan’s legislative 
process.27  Custom requires that the chairperson of such a committee be a senior academic or 
someone of similar social standing.  As a professor of public law who had served at one of the 
nation’s most prestigious national universities and a leading voice on information law issues 
for more than twenty-five years, Masao Horibe appeared to be the perfect choice to lead the 
personal information protection study.  
 In most cases, such committees are appointed by Cabinet ministers with administrative 
responsibility for the subject area.  But at the end of the twentieth century, information and in-
formation technology policy had become matters of the highest national importance.  Accord-
ingly, Horibe and his committee colleagues were not appointed by a mere Cabinet minister. 
Instead, they operated under authority from the “Office to Promote a Society with High Speed 
Information Communications” chaired by the Prime Minister himself.28  The committee (kentō 
bukai) got to work quickly and on October 20, delivered a chairman’s proposal followed by a 
formal Interim Report of the full committee in November.  
 Faced with the need to set policy to govern both government agencies and private entities, 
the Interim Report included the proposal of a single set of “general principles” to be applied 
to both.29  In one passage, authors of the Report mentioned that further study would be re-
25　The website of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications is at www.soumu.go.jp.
26　個人情報保護に関する世論調査, kojin jōhō hogo ni kansuru seronchosa, Survey data cited at 情報公開
ダイジェスト Jōhō Kokai Digest, No. 11 (March 25, 2004).  Similar surveys were conducted in 1981, 1985 
and 1989.
27　The meetings of such committees ordinarily take place behind closed doors.  Although Japan has ad-
opted a freedom of information law, it has not adopted any “sunshine law” mandating that government 
meetings be open to the public.  Many local governments, on the other hand, have adopted ordinances 
requiring open meetings.
28　高度情報通信社会推進本部 kōdo jōhō tsushin shakai suishin honbu.  See Mainichi book, at 60.
29　This would become a major point of contention going forward.  The issues and potential threats to pri-
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quired concerning the constitutional implications of applying the law to the press, publishing, 
and academic research.  This was a surprise.  Everyone understood the importance of special 
protection for personal data in the hands of banks, hospitals and other private organizations 
that regularly collect sensitive information.  But the wording of Japan’s Constitution provides 
robust protection for freedom of speech and of the press.30  This was the first public suggestion 
that drafters were considering applying the law to such constitutionally protected activities. 
The leaders of Japan’s news industry were put on notice that the media might be a target of the 
new regulations.31
 With the Interim Report of the Horibe committee in hand, the government appointed a 
second committee charged with proposing the outline for a statute to be considered by the 
Diet.  This was also a surprise.  It is widely recognized that deliberative committees featuring 
well-known academics and other prominent members of the public primarily serve the purpose 
of providing a forum for interested parties to air their opinions and provide a veneer of neu-
trality to the proceedings.  It is equally well understood that government bureaucrats control 
the agenda and guide committee work down pre-determined pathways.  So far, the Horibe 
committee had seemed to fill the bill.  But now the government decided otherwise.  The new 
group (senmon iinkai) would also report directly to the Cabinet Office under the auspices of 
the Office to Promote High Speed Communications, chaired by the Prime Minister.32  Some 
might think the two committees redundant, but the membership was completely different.  The 
government defended creation of the second committee on the ground that it was more specifi-
cally given the task of legislative drafting.33  Whatever the truth of this claim, there can be no 
dispute that one effect of the move was to push Professor Horibe out of the way.
 The chair of the new committee was Itsuo Sonobe, an administrative law scholar who 
had been selected in 1989 to serve on the Supreme Court.  Sonobe was available because he 
had reached the Court’s mandatory retirement age of 70 in April.  Mainichi reporters would 
later write that many observers thought “[A]t about this time, strong intervention by the bu-
reaucrats became obvious.”34  In a story published soon after the committee began operations, 
the Mainichi reported the disappointment of many, suggesting that the members of the new 
committee had little knowledge of the area and pointing out that the new committee set out to 
interview people that had already been covered by the first committee.35  The Sonobe commit-
vacy posed by the holders of governmental power are completely different from the threats posed by 
private information in the hands of commercial organizations.  Open government advocates would fierce-
ly demand that the two problems be separated and that different rules should apply to governmental and 
non-governmental actors, and that the rules to be applied to the government should be much stronger.  Of 
course, the issues posed by the citizen numbering system had nothing to do with private entities at all. 
The Obuchi promise to his coalition partners in the Komeito and others who opposed the numbering 
system was to create protection against abuse of the new numbering system.
30　The first paragraph of Article 21 of Japan’s Constitution declares that “Freedom of assembly and asso-
ciation as well as speech, press and all other forms of expression are guaranteed.”
31　Tajima, supra n. 8, pp. 83-84.
32　These committees operated under the auspices of the Cabinet Secretariat (naikaku kanbo naikaku naisei 
shingishitsu). 内閣官房内閣内政審議室
33　This explanation was given by Akio Fujii, the senior bureaucrat charged with shepherding the legislative 
process, in an interview on March 8, 2002.  Mainichi Book, p. 72.
34　Mainichi book, p. 66.
35　They even heard members of the Horibe committee as witnesses.  Id., pp. 67-71, reproducing Mainichi 
article of March 14, 2000.
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tee wasted little time.  It held its first meeting on February 4, 2000, delivered an interim report 
on June 2, and its final report in October.36  The report included the proposal that anyone in the 
possession of information concerning 5,000 or more persons follow five general principles in 
their handling of personal information.37  This provision would become the flashpoint for dis-
putes over coverage of the proposed law.
 To supporters of press freedom, the most disturbing aspect of the Sonobe proposal was 
application of the general principles to publishers and the news media.  Wording of the prin-
ciples was vague and government ministries would be empowered to instruct organizations 
to make changes necessary to conform to government interpretations of the principles.  In 
September 2000, Professor Horibe appeared before the Sonobe committee as a witness.  A 
week later he took the extraordinary step of making a written proposal that would eliminate 
the general principles entirely.  He expressed his fear that application of the law to the news 
media and individual citizens generally could have grave effects.  But Horibe had no status as 
a regular committee member; he appeared as a witness and his testimony carried little weight. 
Chairman Sonobe cast Horibe’s proposal and the reservations of critics aside, announcing that 
the committee would recommend applying the general principles to all organizations, includ-
ing the news media.38
 If regulating the news media was a core objective of the ruling political parties and the 
government bureaucracy, then the exchange of Sonobe for Horibe at the head of the Prime 
Minister’s policymaking committee was a timely move indeed.
Government Inspectors in the Newsrooms?
 Once the Sonobe committee report was complete, officials of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications could formally commence the work of drafting legislation.  The 
text of a proposed bill was leaked to the press in February, 2001.  The Mainichi posted the en-
tire text on its website and on the morning of February 16, in tall black type, ran the shocking 
headline “Government Authority for On-Site Inspections.”  The Mainichi report would con-
firm everyone’s worst fears.  Article 50 of the bill granted unambiguous authority for govern-
ment officers to conduct on-site inspections to confirm compliance with the law.  According to 
the Mainichi scoop, government agents were about to gain authority to invade Japan’s news-
rooms.39
 The inspection provision may have been nothing more than a trial balloon.  Whatever the 
sponsors’ real intentions, express authority for on-site inspections was quietly dropped.  In line 
with Japan’s standard annual legislative calendar, the actual bill was approved by the Cabinet 
and submitted for Diet consideration on March 27, 2001.40  The new law would apply to any 
person with possession of information concerning 5,000 persons or more.  Among its provi-
sions, the bill set forth a list of five general principles to govern the gathering and maintenance 
36　The first meeting was attended by Prime Minister Obuchi.  Minutes for Sonobe committee meetings are 
available here: http://www.caa.go.jp/planning/kojin/houseika/index.html.
37　Daily Yomiuri, September 30, 2000, “Proposed law would protect personal information,” p. 1.
38　See Mainichi book, pp. 75-78.
39　Mainichi book, pp. 80-83.
40　Daily Yomiuri, March 28, 2001, “Cabinet approves bill to protect personal info.”
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of personal information: 
・ Clarify the purpose for collecting and using personal information and refrain from using 
such information for purposes not initially pursued.
・ Acquire personal information in a proper manner.
・ Ensure the accuracy of information collected.
・ Prevent the leak of information and take all other necessary steps to keep information pri-
vate.
・ Ensure the transparency of methods used to collect, use and control information.41
 Although news organizations (hōdō kikan) would be exempt from certain provisions of 
the law, they would be bound to respect the five principles.  Indeed, they could be subject to 
administrative sanction for failure to do so.  Moreover, government ministries would be em-
powered to enforce the five general principles.  How would they determine whether an act of 
newsgathering and reporting is “appropriate?”  Officials would enjoy broad discretion. 
 And when we consider the broad scope of “personal information” to be covered by the 
Act, it’s clear that the principles disregard the very nature of news reporting.
Privacy vs. “Personal Information”
 In order to understand the potential impact on reporters, the first step is to consider the 
core concept of “personal information.”  It is generally agreed that news reporters and other 
writers have a duty to respect the “privacy rights” of their subjects.42  But this idea of privacy 
is ordinarily limited to certain kinds of sensitive information where individuals can legitimate-
ly expect that their actions or information will not be publicly revealed.  The most obvious cat-
egories of private information include medical and financial information. 
 The concept of “personal information” proposed by the government was quite different; 
it encompassed a far broader range of information than commonly-understood privacy rights. 
As defined in the 2001 government bill, “personal information” means 
information concerning living persons such as names, dates of birth and other writ-
ings by which a specific individual can be identified.43
 It’s hard to imagine a scope of “personal information” broader than that.  All information 
gathered in the course of a reporter’s investigation that identified specific individuals, whether 
they be government officials or private citizens, would come within this definition.  Among 
other troublesome issues, these rules require organizations in possession of such information 
to “keep such information confidential.”  Of course, the very purpose of every writer and news 
organization is to publish information.  
41　Daily Yomiuri, “Bill must serve freedom of the press,” March 28, 2001 (editorial).
42　The first court decision in Japan to recognize privacy violation as a tort came in 1954, in a case involving 
a novel written by the most famous writer of the time, Yukio Mishima.  See Lawrence W. Beer, Freedom 
of Expression in Japan: A Study in Comparative Law, Politics, and Society (Kodansha, 1984), pp. 325-
330.
43　The 2001 bill is reproduced in Tajima, supra n. 8, p. 204.  The definition for personal information appears 
at 205.  This definition is identical to the wording passed into law in 2003.  Law No. 57 of 2003, Article 
2.
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 There is little doubt that sponsors of the legislation intended to require reporters to obtain 
the approval of any individual named in a story prior to publication.44  When future report-
ers sought to expose a case of bribery or other unlawful conduct, they might need the consent 
of the perpetrators themselves.  If such rules were applied to news organizations, they would 
eliminate investigative reporting in Japan.
 Strident criticism in the news media and lobbying by news organizations fostered strong 
resistance to the proposed law.  The Mainichi even conducted a poll of Dietmembers indicat-
ing that a mere 28% supported passage of the draft law as is.45  And the Diet had many higher 
priorities to consider.  By early summer, the news media was reporting that the government 
bill was not likely to pass the Diet in 2001.  The legislative calendar was getting tight and 
resistance by opposition parties and the news media was strong.  Leaders of the Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ), the largest opposition party, were especially concerned about potential 
limitations on the press and were said to be preparing proposals for revisions to the bill.46
 Then, just as supporters and opponents were locked in this posture, news reports from 
New York showed images of commercial airliners crashing into the World Trade Center.  Now 
the legislative calendar would be flipped in a completely new direction as Diet committees 
launched discussions of emergency measures to address the threat of terrorism.47  In Novem-
ber, the ruling coalition announced it would shelve its personal information bill and carry it 
over for consideration in the next regular Diet session, commencing in spring 2002.
May 2001 – The Courts Ratchet Up Penalties for Libel
 The government’s legislative strategy appeared to closely follow the blueprint set out 
in the LDP’s Tanikawa report of August 1999.  Although the report was quite brief, it cast a 
broad net.  The Tanikawa plan contemplated more than legislative action alone.  Tucked into 
one corner of the report, one could even find a new policy for the nation’s judiciary, too.  
 Japanese law does not provide for trial by jury,48 so individual judges have complete au-
thority to decide issues of both fact and law.  In ordinary civil cases, this means they decide 
the amount of compensation, if any, to be paid by the losing party to the winner.  Members 
of the Tanikawa committee considered the courts’ role in libel trials especially important in 
protecting the personal privacy of individuals wronged by unflattering media treatment.  And 
they were dissatisfied by the courts’ regular practice of granting low damage awards to victori-
ous plaintiffs. In the section on the judiciary, the report unambiguously called for an increase 
in damage payments to successful plaintiffs in libel cases, declaring that executives in Japan’s 
44　See, e.g., Mainichi book, p. 64.
45　Details of the poll appear in Mainichi Book, p. 84.  The poll surveyed members’ responses to a package 
of three proposed laws:  personal information protection, administrative agency information protection 
and human rights protection law.
46　Daily Yomiuri, June 3, 2001, “Current Diet unlikely to OK info bill.”
47　The laws passed in the shadow of 9/11 included a revision to the Self-Defense Forces law creating a new 
category of information labeled “defense secrets” and providing criminal punishment for persons in-
volved in disclosure of the same.
48　As of this writing, there is no serious proposal that Japan adopt a trial system in civil cases.  The “lay 
judge system” (saiban’in seido) launched in 2009 differs from the Anglo-American jury system in sig-
nificant ways and applies only to serious criminal cases.
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publishing houses contemptuously dismissed libel suits as “million yen cases” and thought that 
making such payments when they lost was just a standard cost of doing business.  
 The judges were on cue.  Just a year after appearance of the LDP’s Tanikawa report, the 
Judicial Research and Training Institute (managed by Japan’s Supreme Court) empaneled a 
committee of elite judges to consider the size of damage awards in libel cases.  Panel members 
were serving on the bench at Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya district courts.  One member was a To-
kyo High Court judge (Shigeki Inoue).  The panel’s final report, issued in May 2001,49 reached 
precisely the same conclusion as the LDP’s Tanikawa committee.  It recommended sharply 
increased damage awards and presented a list of factors to be considered by judges when cal-
culating amounts.  And the courts had already started to move in this direction even before the 
report was written.  In a libel decision issued in February 2001, Tokyo District Court ruled in 
favor of actress Reiko Ohara and ordered a weekly magazine to pay the previously unheard 
sum of 5 million yen (assuming a rate of ¥120 = $1.00, approximately $ 40,000).  The follow-
ing month baseball star Kazuhiro Kiyohara doubled this figure, winning an award of ten mil-
lion yen in his suit against another weekly magazine.50
 Since Japan’s courts have not adopted a rule comparable to the American “actual malice” 
doctrine, publishers do not gain special latitude when they carry stories about government offi-
cials.  In fact, the judges’ panel recommended precisely the opposite result, suggesting higher 
damage amounts for public officials (described as “Dietmembers, lawyers, etc.”) than for or-
dinary citizen plaintiffs (“others”).  So the month after the baseball star won ten million yen, 
Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori himself won an award of three million yen.  Soon other politi-
cians followed his example and successfully won substantial judgments.  Future Prime Minis-
ter Shinzo Abe also joined the parade, winning a more modest sum (half million yen) in a libel 
judgment against a magazine in April 2006.51
 Japan’s judiciary is a tightly-organized top-down bureaucracy that can move far more 
swiftly than a legislature.52  Whatever the fate of the proposed legislation carried to the Diet by 
Japan’s ruling party might be, the judges were already delivering exactly what the LDP asked 
for.  Publishers would more carefully consider the “human rights” of Japanese politicians or 
incur the risk of heavy financial penalties.  In fact, these developments were soon followed by 
the closure of at least one well-known investigative journal and suits posing severe threats to 
journalists, including some with well-established reputations.53
49　The text of the report, together with articles by panel members, was published in the prominent journal 
Hanrei Times.  107 Hanrei Times 4 (November 15, 2001).
50　“Media firms face soaring damages,” Asahi Evening News, Nov. 23, 2001.
51　“Publisher told to pay damages to Abe,” Asahi Shimbun, Eng. ed., April 22-23, 2006.  According to this 
report, the court awarded compensation because the publication used “insulting expressions intended to 
make readers believe the plaintiff lacked any ability.”  Abe would serve as prime minister during 2006-
07 and then for a second term that commenced in December 2012 and continues as this is written in 
January 2015.
52　For reference, see Mark Levin, “Civil Justice and the Constitution: Limits on Instrumental Judicial Ad-
ministration in Japan,” Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 265-318 (2011).
53　See e.g., Tony McNicol and David McNeill, “Is Press Freedom Being Eroded in Japan?” www.japanfocus.
org/products/details/2377.
22　　MEIJI LAW JOURNAL / 22
March 2002 – The Koizumi Cabinet Sets the Legislative Agenda
 At a formal Cabinet meeting held on Friday, March 15, 2002, a resolution was passed to 
submit a new package of personal information protection bills to the Diet.  Much had changed 
since the summer of 1999 when the Diet had passed the numbering law and Prime Minister 
Obuchi had solemnly promised a law to guard against government abuse.  Two separate ad-
visory committees had submitted their reports and a proposed law had been submitted to the 
Diet.  The premiership had changed hands twice.  Obuchi succumbed to a severe stroke in 
April 2000 and was replaced as prime minister by Yoshiro Mori five days later.  Mori had a 
very negative public image and fell victim to some of the lowest popularity ratings in postwar 
history.  After only twelve months on the job, Mori was replaced by an LDP maverick named 
Jun’ichiro Koizumi.  Koizumi took office one month after the Mori Cabinet submitted its per-
sonal information bill to the Diet in March 2001.
 The new prime minister had no apparent connection to the personal information cam-
paign.  He had been swept into office in order to counter mass dissatisfaction with economic 
conditions in Japan generally and with the old-style politics epitomized by outgoing Prime 
Minister Mori.  
 By March 2002, all interested parties had had plenty of time to carefully review the gov-
ernment’s approach to personal information protection.  Spokespersons for the media and for 
civil rights organizations were on the alert.  When the Koizumi Cabinet formally approved a 
new package of personal information protection laws, Japan’s media world was ready with 
its response.  The editors of the Asahi Shimbun took advantage of the opinion section of their 
Sunday edition to provide a forum for opponents of the law.  When readers opened their 
morning newspapers on Sunday, March 17, two days after the Cabinet resolution, they found 
a special package of commentary headlined with the introduction: “It appears that two bills 
concerning personal information protection – one to apply to administrative agencies and one 
to private entities that handle personal information – will be considered in the current Diet ses-
sion.  The protection of privacy and personal information itself is important.  However, critics 
have charged that the law to be applied to private entities will damage ‘freedom of the press’ 
and will limit the people’s ‘right to know.’  We have gathered the opinions of four experts.”54
 The collection of experts was impressive, including one of Japan’s best-known news 
commentators, a leading media lawyer, a citizen activist, and Professor Masao Horibe himself, 
chairperson of the government’s first advisory committee on personal information protection. 
Since the project had been hijacked and delivered to another advisory committee, the Horibe 
committee report was likely to be of interest only to historians.  The chairperson himself was 
left to express his thoughts in the commentary section of the newspaper.  In a masterpiece of 
Japanese understatement and self-restraint, Horibe quietly noted that he disagreed with some 
of the findings of the second committee concerning the relationship of free speech and per-
sonal information protection and referred readers to minutes of the Horibe committee if they 
wished to know his own opinions.  His final sentence conveyed a forlorn sense of hope: “How-
ever, fears and opposing opinions have been expressed.  I hope a broad discussion will develop 
54　Asahi Shimbun, March 17, 2002.
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in the course of Diet deliberations.”55
 The commentator, Yoshiko Sakurai – a popular writer who had launched her career as a 
television news announcer – was rather more direct than the reserved academic Horibe.  “The 
original purpose of the bill,” she wrote, “was to prevent the abuse of individual information 
in the IT Age.  But when you look under the hood, you find it was transformed into a picture-
perfect media control law.”56  She thus expressed the emerging consensus among Japan’s intel-
ligencia: a primary purpose of the government’s “personal information protection” law was 
media control.  
 In the minds of many, any doubts on this point would be eliminated by the appearance of 
an entirely separate bill also presented for Diet deliberation in March 2002.  This one was la-
beled a “human rights protection” law.  
A New Human Rights Protection Bill Targets “Excessive Reporting”
 Like better personal information protection, the demand for expanded human rights pro-
tection was an old topic.  Human rights lawyers and activists inside Japan and out had sought 
changes for some time.  A key feature of their plan was creation of an independent human 
rights commission in Japan.  The UN Human Rights Committee itself had requested Japan to 
take such action in 1998 to address “allegations of serious human rights violations at immigra-
tion detention centers and prisons.”57  Of course, such facilities were run under the direction 
of Japan’s Ministry of Justice itself, which was also the agency charged with drafting the new 
human rights protection law.  The emerging MOJ proposal would clearly indicate that the Min-
istry was not driven by the same concerns as the UN Committee.
 The strong demand for “human rights protection” from within the Japanese establishment 
had nothing to do with treatment of prisoners, discrimination against minorities, or other is-
sues typically raised by citizen activists or the UN Committee.  Instead, the demand was for – 
greater protection against attacks in the news media.  
 By now LDP leaders had established the story that the most dangerous perpetrators of hu-
man rights violations were news reporters.  The politicians had been burned by bad press one 
too many times.  The appetite of Japan’s news media for the intimate details of bribery and 
other wrongdoing by Japan’s ruling party politicians had been demonstrated time and again, 
most recently in its exposure of an idiosyncratic (and powerful) lawmaker named Muneo Su-
zuki.58  As we have seen, the final report of the Tanikawa Committee called for a series of new 
laws to protect “personal information.”  In the words of the Mainichi, the five general prin-
ciples included in the personal information protection bill approved by the Cabinet in March 
2001 were “exactly what the (Tanikawa) committee report was aiming for.”59  When Mainichi 
writers reported their suspicion of “strong intervention by the bureaucrats” in the work of the 
55　Masao Horibe, hyōgen no jiyū to no chōsei hakatta (“Accomodation to freedom of expression planned”), 
Asahi Shimbun, March 17, 2002.
56　Yoshiko Sakurai, shuzai bōshi ni akuyō sareru osore (“Fear of abuse to obstruct newsgathering”), id.
57　Editorial in the Asahi Evening News, July 11, 2002.
58　“Muneo,” as he was dubbed in the popular press, appeared to be a comic figure most famous for scream-
ing at the top of his lungs when he criticized bureaucrats appearing before him, thus allowing his finan-
cial backers to hear him represent their interests although they were located in the room next door.
59　Mainichi book, p. 63. See also, Tajima, supra n. 8, pp. 2-3.
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Sonobe committee,60 they were saying that the bureaucrats had been directed to bend the report 
in a way to meet the demands of LDP members seeking protection from Japan’s news report-
ers.61
 The same forces would shape the design of the new human rights law.  As in the case of 
the personal information protection bills, a blue ribbon advisory panel studied the issue and 
made recommendations for action.62  The proposed law called for the appointment of a new 
domestic Human Rights Commission, which would report to the Minister of Justice.  Among 
its powers, the Commission would be authorized to investigate and assist complainants who 
might seek redress in cases of unfair media coverage or when privacy rights are violated or 
discrimination or other human rights violations occur.  Of greatest interest to news organiza-
tions, the law would prohibit “excessive reporting.”  
 The bill defined “excessive reporting” to mean “continuing or repeating reporting activi-
ties against a person’s will and significantly disrupting the peace of a person’s life.”63  When 
Diet interpellations commenced and an opposition Diet member asked how many times a 
phone call or fax message would have to be repeated to be excessive, Justice Minister Mori-
yama delivered the non-response that each case would have to be judged “in an appropriate 
manner on the basis of facts in specific individual cases.”64  The new Commission (and the 
Ministry of Justice) would exercise discretion to fill in the blanks.  
 The Human Rights Commission envisioned by Japan’s political leaders would not be 
independent.  Commissioners would be appointed by the government and would report to the 
Justice Minister; the Commission’s budget would be included within the overall Justice Min-
istry budget.  It appeared that the new Commission would operate as an arm of the Ministry, 
with a special mandate to keep tabs on the reporters.  This was not what UN Human Rights 
Committee had in mind when they called for Japan to set up an “independent” commission.65 
After reviewing the Justice Ministry proposal, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights 
Mary Robinson sent a letter to Prime Minister Koizumi expressing her disappointment and ex-
plaining why the proposal utterly failed to meet the Committee’s longstanding request.66
 In an opinion filed with the Minister of Justice on March 25, the Japan Civil Liberties 
Union declared that the activities of the news media should not be subject to the proposed 
Commission’s remedial system.  “In light of the constitutional guarantee of and the importance 
of the freedom of expression and freedom of press in a democratic society,” said the JCLU, 
“governmental interference in these activities should be as limited as possible.  Remedies 
against (objectionable behavior by the news media) should be found primarily in the self-
regulatory systems set up by the media and, where government intervention is required, in the 
60　Mainichi book, p. 66.
61　Members of the LDP Tanikawa committee continued to monitor progess on the proposed personal infor-
mation protection law.  Nikkei Telecom, 11/01/00.
62　In this case, the committee worked under the authority of the Ministry of Justice, rather than the Cabinet 
Office.  The committee was appointed in 1997 and delivered its report in May 2001.
63　Daily Yomiuri, Feb. 24, 2002, “Media focus of rights bill” (definition of “excessive reporting”).
64　Asahi Shimbun, English ed., April 25, 2002.
65　A set of principles to govern the operations of independent national human rights bodies was adopted by 
the U.N. General Assembly in 1993.  See http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/ParisPrinciples-
20yearsguidingtheworkofNHRI.aspx
66　Asahi Shimbun, July 2, 2002, “人権法案， 国連が問題視　高等弁務官， 小泉首相に信書” (“United 
Nations Sees Problems in the Human Rights Bill”)
“Personal Information,” Media Control, and Government Power－Legislative Battles in Japan, 1999-2003　　25
courts.”67
Media Control? – “Bad laws with no counterpart anywhere in the world”
 News reports soon linked the personal information protection and human rights proposals 
together with a bill to restrict objectionable material that might come into the hands of minors 
as the “Three Media Control Bills.”68  Alongside articles in newspapers and magazines, a wide 
range of organizations and prominent individuals would weigh in with op-eds and more formal 
proposals to derail the government’s plans.  On April 24, for example, the Asahi carried an 
article by a poet and novelist named “Takashi Tsujii” condemning the threats to free society 
posed by the government’s plan.  Tsujii was the pen name of the late Seiji Tsutsumi, a scion of 
the Seibu Group, one of Japan’s great postwar commercial empires.
 On April 20, only four days before commencement of the Diet’s regular session, Japan’s 
national federation of bar associations (Nichibenren) issued a formal declaration addressed to 
the Justice Minister calling for delay in starting the Juki Net system and for thorough review 
of the proposed bills.  On April 24, the Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association 
issued a statement condemning both the human rights protection and the privacy protection 
laws, declaring that the bills would “pave the way for government intervention in the freedom 
of speech guaranteed by the Constitution.”69  Such formal statements by the Association are 
quite rare.  The last time the Association had achieved full consensus and issued such an ex-
traordinary declaration was in May 1987, when Association members were moved to condemn 
the shooting of two Asahi Shimbun reporters.
 On the following day, an ad hoc group of prominent writers staged a press conference at 
the Japan Press Center Building in Hibiya.  Among the leaders of this group was 74-year old 
Saburo Shiroyama, best-selling author of corporate crime and historical novels.  Like Tsut-
sumi, the old man carried memories of a childhood in an authoritarian state and was thus well-
suited to play the role of voice of the past.  When the government’s first bill had appeared in 
2001, he wrote a letter to the Prime Minister seeking an appointment to explain his views. 
Shiroyama saw the proposed laws as a reprise of the “Peace Preservation Law”70 of the bad old 
days that led to the loss of civil liberties and to war.  Koizumi had met with him the preceding 
August and said that he would consider his views carefully.  Now the old writer was shocked 
to see that the prime minister had ignored his counsel.  According to Shiroyama, the govern-
ment was “seeking to make bad laws with no counterpart anywhere in the world.”71
 The writers’ press conference and other events were timed for the commencement of 
formal Diet consideration of the government bills that week, starting with Justice Minister 
67　Universal Principle (English language newsletter of the Japan Civil Liberties Union), No. 10, Winter 
2002.  Full text available at http://www.jclu.org/katsudou/universal_principle/articles/335nhrc.html.
68　E.g., Asahi Shimbun, April 25, 2002, reporting commencement of Diet session.
69　Asahi Shimbun, Eng. ed., April 26, 2002.
70　The nearly hysterical reaction of opponents of the bill like Shiroyama was rooted in Japan’s pre-war ex-
perience, when free speech and other civil liberties were severely curtailed by thought control laws and 
zealous prosecutors.  The “Peace Preservation Law” was adopted by Japan’s Diet in 1925 and remained 
in effect until the end of World War II.  It provided government officials with wide-ranging powers to 
limit free speech and assembly.
71　Asahi Shimbun, April 26, 2002, p. 39.
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Mayumi Moriyama’s appearance before the House of Councillors on April 24.  The outpour-
ing by writers and media organizations made excellent fodder for opposition party questioning 
of Moriyama and other government spokespersons.  The Diet sessions themselves would be 
reported in fine detail in the press and the cycle would move forward.  The barrage from the 
media advocates had immediate effect.  By April 25 leaders of LDP coalition partner Komeito 
let it be known that they would seek revision of the government’s proposals.72
 Writers sometimes supported their condemnations of the bills with purported simulations 
illustrating what might happen if the proposals actually became law.  For example, in a “Re-
porter’s Eye” column, a Mainichi writer explained why “it will become extremely difficult to 
pursue suspicions regarding politicians, large scale fraud and other social ills.”73  The essence 
of the reporter’s complaint was that when requested, he and his colleagues would be required 
to disclose information on individuals gathered in the course of their investigations.  Targets of 
news investigations would then be in a position to request sources to clam up.  He also feared 
that under the “human rights protection” bill, ordinary reporting activities could be deemed hu-
man rights violations. 
 Under the new system, publishers would be restrained not only by the private law regimes 
of libel and privacy, which empower individuals to bring suits to seek compensation from their 
tormentors, but by government power as well.  The news media would be subject to govern-
ment regulation like electrical power companies or subway lines.  Because the nature of their 
business was information gathering rather than electricity or transport, they would naturally be 
subject to government investigations of whether their reporting methods met legal standards. 
The survival of independent news reporting was clearly at stake.  
 On Sunday May 12, the Yomiuri, Japan’s biggest daily with distribution of approximately 
10 million copies (a conservative newspaper probably best-known for its ownership of Japan’s 
most popular baseball team), issued its own proposal for revision of the government’s personal 
information bills.  This time the message got through.  Prime Minister Koizumi responded on 
the following day, saying that he was issuing orders to revise the proposal.74  Things had gone 
too far.
Personal Information Protection and the Government
 While public debate was dominated by writers and publishers who wailed about threats to 
free speech posed by the government bills, there seemed to be little discussion of the original 
problem that inspired the need for personal information protection.  This was the fear that gov-
ernment officers would find ways to improperly use the citizen numbering system.  The law 
authorizing citizen numbering had passed the Diet back in 1999, with a three-year fuse.  By 
the spring of 2002, implementation was only a few months away.   The central issues posed by 
citizen numbering system had nothing to do with regulating news organizations or other pri-
vate entities at all.  Prime Minister Obuchi offered his Komeito coalition partners and others a 
72　Asahi Shimbun, April 25, 2002.
73　Mainichi book, p. 95.
74　But opposition legislators erupted when they saw that the proposal before the Cabinet committee of the 
Diet remained the same and they were forced to deliberate a proposal the PM himself had labeled defec-
tive.  Mainichi book, at 91.
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quid pro quo law to create protection against potential government abuse of personal informa-
tion in order to gain their support for passage of the new numbering law.  His successors had 
delivered something very different indeed.
 The issues and potential threats to privacy posed by those who exercise governmental 
power are quite different from the threats posed by commercial organizations.  Open govern-
ment advocates fiercely demanded that the two problems be separated and that different rules 
should apply to governmental and non-governmental actors, and that the rules to be applied to 
the government should be much stronger.75
 There was one law that restricted government use of personal information already in 
place.  This law, the “Act for the Protection of Computer Processed Data Held by Administra-
tive Organs,” had been adopted by the Diet in 1988.  But it was judged woefully inadequate by 
proponents for reform.76  Among its failings, the 1988 law applied only to electronic records, 
leaving paper documents unprotected.  And although the law enabled citizens to examine their 
own files, it did not empower them to petition for corrections.  Moreover, the law applied only 
to records expressly designated as “individual information files,” leaving much sensitive infor-
mation outside the scope of coverage.  And critics complained that the 1988 law provided no 
penalties whatever for officials who might violate its terms and use citizens’ records improp-
erly.
 Along with an umbrella statute which included provisions to be applied to both govern-
ment agencies and private entities, in March 2002, the Koizumi Cabinet approved a separate 
bill to apply exclusively to government agencies, the “Administrative Agency Individual In-
formation Protection Law.”  In form, it would be a revision to the existing 1988 law.  This law 
would carry the primary burden in establishing rules to block improper use of personal infor-
mation by government officials.  
May 28, 2002 – Japan’s Defense Agency Converts the “Information Dis-
closure Law” into a Surveillance Tool
 As all parties mulled the effect of the counterattacks by the newspapers, bar associations, 
writers’ groups and other opponents and the cease-fire declared by the Prime Minister, scandal 
hit the front pages, suddenly throwing the personal information story in a completely unex-
pected direction.  On the morning of Tuesday, May 28, readers of the Mainichi would find the 
headline “Defense Agency – Makes List of Information Requesters, Investigates Identities of 
More Than One Hundred.”77
 During the legislative onslaught of 1999 which inspired the comment that “this is the 
year the shape of the country changed,” one statute of a completely different nature made its 
way through the legislative gauntlet.  This was Japan’s first national “information disclosure” 
law.  It empowered anyone to file information requests with any national government agency. 
Agencies are required to disclose requested information unless they can cite one of six catego-
75　Tajima, supra no. 8, p. 19.  “Universal Principle,” English newsletter of the Japan Civil Liberties Union, 
Vol. 9, Summer 2001, p. 8.  Available at www.jclu.org.
76　The Act for the Protection of Computer Processed Data Held by Administrative Organs, Act No. 95, 
Dec. 16, 1988.  (www.soumu.go.jp/gyoukan/kanri/b_11e.htm)  (Amended on May 30, 2003)
77　Mainichi Shimbun, May 28, 2002.
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ries of exempt information.  Loosely based on the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, Japan’s 
disclosure law symbolized the country’s commitment to join a global movement toward great-
er transparency in government.  Passed into law in 1999, the new disclosure system took effect 
on April 1, 2001.78
 Commencing in April 2001, all national government agencies began to receive requests 
to examine government files.  Of course, these agencies included the Defense Agency and all 
branches of the Self-Defense Forces.
 According to the Mainichi account, someone in the Defense Agency hit upon a very 
clever idea: the information disclosure system could be easily converted into an information 
collection system.  Officials appeared to believe that anyone who dared to request the Agency 
to open its files should be viewed as a threat.  So the Agency started compiling lists of docu-
ment requesters.  Then Agency personnel conducted background investigations, obtaining age, 
employment information, and other details of the requesters.  Lists uncovered by the Mainichi 
carried notations that some requesters were reporters, others were former members of Japan’s 
defense forces, others were family members, and so on.79
 The Mainichi account concluded with a quote from an official of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications (MICA) suggesting that, if this were true, it would constitute a 
violation of Japan’s 1988 law, which limits the circumstances in which government officials 
are allowed to create computerized “personal information files.”  The account did not fail to 
note that the 1988 law did not set any penalties for violation, a trait it had in common with the 
government’s 2002 administrative agency personal information protection proposal. 
 The Mainichi account touched off a furor.  Among the plethora of recent laws adopted to 
increase government control and enforce discipline, the information disclosure law alone had 
created a new tool to empower citizens to monitor the activities of government.  But as soon 
as the new system came into force, Defense Agency officers turned it on its head, transform-
ing it into a new tool to spy on those citizens who showed the temerity to file requests to see 
official files.  On the afternoon of the Mainichi scoop, Kyoji Yanagisawa, the head of the De-
fense Agency secretariat, held a press conference to clarify the facts and respond to reporters’ 
queries.  He said that initial indications showed that the lists were the work of one officer in 
78　For an English translation of Japan’s information disclosure law, ongoing commentary on open govern-
ment issues, and related information, see http://www.freedominfo.org/regions/east-asia/japan/.
79　Perhaps the extreme sensitivity of Defense Agency officials to the prying eyes of information requesters 
can be explained by the commencement and expansion of Self-Defense Force operations in the Indian 
Ocean and the Middle East.  Despite the constitutional ban on “use of force to settle international dis-
putes,” Prime Minister Koizumi issued broad declarations of support for US operations in the Middle 
East immediately after the 9/11 Incident.  This was followed by the passage of a Special Measures Act on 
October 28, 2001 authorizing the deployment of forces.  By November 9 Maritime Self-Defense destroy-
ers were on their way to the Indian Ocean.  These warships would be followed by an Aegis destroyer in 
December 2002, Air Self-Defense Force planes flying support missions for U.S. forces, another Special 
Measures Act in July 2003 that authorized the deployment of ground forces in Iraq and the deployment 
of a small contingent of those forces in Iraq in the winter of 2003-04.  Various aspects of SDF operations 
were certainly in violation of longstanding interpretations of Constitution Article 9 as well as the texts of 
the Special Measures Acts themselves.  For details see Michael Penn, Japan and the War on Terror.  (I.B. 
Tauris, 2014)  As Defense Agency and Self-Defense Force leaders contemplated unprecedented expan-
sion of their operations in a foreign war zone, they would naturally expect sharp criticism of such opera-
tions from many quarters.  The simple investigation of information requesters was likely only one of 
many measures taken in efforts to identify potential political opponents.
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the Maritime Services and that a total of only seven people knew of the lists.  The press con-
ference was televised live and detailed accounts appeared in all daily newspapers and in other 
media. 
 When he was asked about the incident at Diet proceedings the following day, Prime Min-
ister Koizumi would say that the government’s current legislative proposals might have to be 
modified.80  In succeeding days, reporters dug for more details and editorial columns filled 
with cries of indignation over “traitors to the spirit of the disclosure law.”
 When the story broke, the head of the Defense Agency, an LDP Dietmember (and former 
SDF officer) named Gen Nakatani, had been out of the country.  Taking command of the crisis 
management effort after his return, Nakatani held a press conference together with Adminis-
trative Vice Minister Yasunari Ito on Monday, June 3.  The Defense Agency Director would 
report that many of the details released the previous week were incorrect.  Far from being the 
tool of a single misguided Maritime Services officer, it turned out that the Agency itself and 
each of the three armed services had established lists of their own.  And yes, in each case, lists 
were posted on local area networks for easy access by a broad range of officers.  How broadly 
were the lists used?  Well, the Director couldn’t really say.  “It will take time (to investigate) 
because there are so many people involved,” he said.81  Nakatani promised a full investiga-
tion.82
 On June 6, the four major opposition parties issued a joint statement criticizing the gov-
ernment’s personal information protection bills.  Along with other critics, they stressed that 
the dangers presented by abuse of information in government systems, especially once the 
Juki Net system came online, is far greater than the risk presented by personal information in 
private hands.  They naturally cited the Defense Agency incident as a clear illustration of the 
danger to individual privacy.
 Defense Agency Director Nakatani had bravely declared there would be a full investiga-
tion and the results released to the public, but when June 11, the day for this report arrived, he 
changed his mind.  Under pressure from senior LDP leaders, he withheld the full 38-page re-
port and released only a 4-page summary instead.  Faced with yet another uproar, he reversed 
this decision within hours and released the full report anyway.83
 But more damage had been done.  Outraged at the blatant interference by leaders of the 
ruling coalition to block release of the report, on Thursday June 13, all opposition parties de-
manded a further investigation and commenced a boycott of Diet deliberations.  The govern-
ment was eager to push a range of legislation, especially its proposals concerning military pre-
paredness, but now the national legislature was at a standstill.   
80　Daily Yomiuri, May 30, 2002, “Gov’t may modify info bill.”
81　News reports of June 3, 2002.
82　On June 4, the Mainichi reported an exchange from the LDP national defense committee in which an 
LDP Diet member asks “Why is creation of these lists wrong?  Instead, the question to ask is `why did it 
leak (to the media)?`”  Yasunari Ito, administrative vice minister responds, “Whoever leaked this is the 
problem.”  (“Morashita yatsu ga warui.”)  After the meeting, Ito told a Mainichi reporter that the thrust 
of his statement was to accuse whoever posted the lists on the LAN as the wrongdoer.  Mainichi Shimbun, 
June 4, 2002, eve. ed.
83　See front page stories in all newspapers, June 12, 2002.
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“Hard on the People, Easy on the Officials” 
 Opponents of the government’s proposals saw the Defense Agency Incident as a golden 
opportunity to make their point.  The issues raised by the administrative information protec-
tion law were abstract and not widely understood.  The handful of civil liberties lawyers and 
constitutional law professors who did understand the issues did not have access to the nation’s 
mass media apparatus the way ordinary news reporters did.  But anyone could understand the 
issues raised by the Defense Agency Incident.  
 Ten days after the Mainichi report, a tiny non-profit rights group called Information 
Clearinghouse Japan published a twenty-page booklet that clarified the key issues to everyone. 
The authors used the Defense Agency Incident as a case study, dissecting the story into six 
discrete issues, each one illustrated by facts from the Defense Agency case.  The same group 
organized a rally in a large conference room at the Lower House Dietmembers’ offices on June 
7.  The gathering was attended by a few activists and a handful of opposition lawmakers.
 Although many called for the resignation of the Defense Agency chief, Mr. Nakatani 
managed to keep his job.  On Friday, June 21, he announced disciplinary action against 29 
Defense Agency officials, including pay cuts for himself and Administrative Vice Minister 
Ito.84  Along with administrative punishments to Defense Agency officials, the LDP issued an 
apology to opposition political parties for interfering in release of the investigative report.  The 
apology was accepted by the opposition and Diet debate resumed a normal schedule on Mon-
day, June 24.85
 With its hands full clearing up the Defense Agency mess, the ruling coalition gave up on 
any attempt to pass personal information protection legislation in 2002.  As summarized in one 
Asahi account, “Opposition parties’ resistance to the bills only grew stronger with the Defense 
Agency revelations.  Although the bills now before the Diet carry penalties for people in the 
private sector who abuse personal information, there are no such provisions for public sector 
officials.”86
 But opposition parties continued to call for further investigations and embarrassing details 
continued to leak out.  On July 4, for example, the Asahi reported that the information disclo-
sure office of the Air Self Defense Force regularly passed on copies of its lists to Tokyo-based 
intelligence officers.  In the minds of these military officers, it appears that the act of filing 
an information request qualifies the requester as a potential target for an undercover investi-
gation.87  To guard against the possibility of such incidents in the future, the Defense Agency 
announced plans to bar former intelligence officers from working in information disclosure of-
fices.88
84　Asahi Shimbun, Eng. ed., June 21, 2002.
85　Id.
86　Asahi Shimbun, Eng. ed., June 8-9, 2002.
87　The issue would be revived in June 2007 when the secretary general of the Communist Party of Japan 
announced that he had received a copy of internal Japan Defense Department documents showing that 
Department officers compiled reports on individuals who had publicly criticized Japan’s participation in 
the Iraq War and other government policies.
88　Asahi Shimbun, Eng. ed., July 4, 2002.
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August 5, 2002 – Japan’s Citizen Numbering System Goes Live
 Japan’s family register is the core document that formally recognizes the identity and lin-
eage of every Japanese citizen, recording each birth, death, marriage and divorce.89  The citizen 
numbering system established by the 1999 Juki Net law took advantage of the existing family 
registry, attaching an 11-digit identifying number to every Japanese at the time their birth is 
recorded.  The law also established a network, providing online access to officials anywhere 
in the country.  Any government office would be able to make electronic confirmation of the 
name, address, gender and birthdate of any individual Japanese.  Thus, an official in the pen-
sion division of the Tokyo headquarters of the Ministry of Health, for example, could quickly 
confirm the identity of a Mr. Tanaka who hailed from a small town in Kyushu or a Ms. Sato 
from a mountain village in Niigata.
 The numbering system was intimately bound up with the “electronic government” initia-
tive of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.  The 1999 law authorized use of 
the numbers in 93 different administrative procedures.  But this was only the beginning.  In 
summer 2002, the Diet had already received a government bill proposing to expand application 
of the numbers to 264 different procedures, including issuance of passports and applications 
for the entrance exam to the national legal research institute.90  Eventually, each citizen could 
carry an identification card with an embedded chip enabling her to simply present the card to 
any government office in the country to record a change of address or initiate other action.
 Opinion polls showed that the government proposal was deeply unpopular.  On July 22, 
the Asahi published the results of a telephone survey of approximately 2,000 persons.  Only 
37% thought the system would result in increased efficiency.  A whopping 87% were con-
cerned about the risk of leaks or other abuses of personal information, including 49% who 
said they were “very much” concerned.  76% said that implementation of the system should 
be delayed.  A few days later the Asahi published the results of a survey of local governments 
indicating that many were not prepared to take on the duties imposed by the system.  20% of 
the local governments polled did not even keep any records of access to computer systems that 
contain residents’ data.91  How could they protect against unauthorized use if they don’t even 
maintain an access log?
 The new system was scheduled to go live on the morning of Monday, August 5.  With the 
abandonment of the government’s proposed information protection law, however, the Obuchi 
promise of 1999 remained unfulfilled.  Throughout July there was a growing storm of criticism 
and calls for delay in starting up the system.  Small demonstrations protesting the Big Brother 
tracking system were led by the commentator Yoshiko Sakurai and others.  Some protesters 
decorated themselves with giant barcodes and other images to catch the attention of news pho-
tographers.92  One group formed by Sakurai and a prominent public interest attorney named 
89　Ordinarily, each birth is recorded under the name of the father of the child; each female child remains in 
her father` s registry until marriage, when she moves to her husband`s file; each male child establishes a 
registry of his own upon marriage or the death of his father.
90　Mainichi Shimbun, May 31, 2002.
91　Asahi Shimbun, Eng. ed., July 27-28, 2002.
92　Doug Struck, “Don’t Store My Data, Japanese tell government,” (International Herald Tribune, Aug. 
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Tsutomu Shimizu used the catchphrase “I Don’t Want to Be a Number!”
 But the train had left the station.  National leaders disregarded the criticism and drove for-
ward.  But they were in for another surprise.  Although Juki Net is a national system created by 
a national law, the family registries are maintained not by a central government agency, but by 
local governments throughout the country.  Implementing the new system would thus require 
the cooperation of thousands of local governments.
 On July 22, the mayor of the small town of Yamatsuri, to the north of Tokyo in Fukushi-
ma Prefecture, announced that his town would not connect to the national system.  On August 1, 
the mayor of Suginami, a western Tokyo ward with more than five hundred thousand residents, 
made a similar declaration.  On the following day, the 36-year old mayor of Yokohama, a city 
with a population of nearly three and half million, declared that participation in the system 
would be voluntary to Yokohama residents.  Residents would have six months to notify the 
city if they wished to be excluded from the system.
 When the system came online on the morning of Monday, August 5, headlines read “Juki 
Net Online – Minus 4 Million Holdouts.”  Such widespread defiance of a national govern-
ment directive was a first.  For decades, local governments had served as the powerless pawns 
of Tokyo, heavily dependent on financial support from the capital and eager to score brownie 
points at every opportunity.93
 By autumn 2002, Japan’s personal information policy was in confusion.  The national 
government had been forced to abandon both its “human rights protection” law and its heavy-
handed “personal information protection” regime.  Local politicians had been emboldened to 
defy the national government.  And the Obuchi promise had failed; the Japanese people got a 
citizen numbering system without the promised protection. 
The Diet Approves the New Law
 With the turn of the calendar, the blossoms of spring would arrive once more.  Again the 
Cabinet would be charged with composing a legislative agenda for the year to come.  This time 
there were no surprises.  The Koizumi Cabinet approved a revised set of personal information 
protection bills in March 2003 and these bills were passed by the Diet two months later.  They 
would take effect on April 1, 2005.94
 Like the original proposal, the law defines “personal information” to mean “information 
concerning living persons such as names, dates of birth and other writings by which a specific 
individual can be identified” and requires organizations that handle a large volume of personal 
24-25, 2002 (Washington Post)).
93　It was this attitude that had led to the “kan-kan settai” practice exposed only a few years before. See 
Lawrence Repeta, “Local Government Disclosure Systems in Japan,” The National Bureau of Asian 
Research, Oct. 1999.
94　Act on the Protection of Personal Information (個人情報の保護に関する法律), Law No. 57 of 2003, Eng-
lish translation at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=131&vm=04&re=02; Act on 
the Protection of Personal Information Held by Administrative Organs (行政機関の保有する個人情報の
保護に関する法律), Law No. 58 of 2003, English translation at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/
law/detail/?id=131&vm=04&re=02; and Act on the Protection of Personal Information Held by Indepen-
dent Administrative Agencies, etc. (独立行政法人の保有する個人情報の保護に関する法律), Law 
No. 59 of 2003,” English translation at https://jrecin.jst.go.jp/seek/SeekDescription?id=003&ln=1.
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information to specify the purposes for which they gather personal information, insure that the 
information was gathered with the approval of individuals concerned, safeguard against leak-
age of the information to third parties and take other measures.  Finally, these organizations are 
subject to oversight by a government ministry and may be required to follow instructions of 
the ministry in their handling of the information.
 Chastened perhaps by the conflicts of the preceding two years, the government made 
several revisions intended to appease its critics.  Foremost among these was elimination of the 
five “general principles” which had incited such an explosive reaction from the press.  More-
over, the established news media won an express exemption from the definition of private or-
ganizations subject to the law.  Article 50 exempted religious and political groups, universities 
and academic research institutions, persons in the “business of writing” (chōjutsu wo gyō to 
suru), “broadcasters, newspapers, news wire services, and other news reporting agencies (hōdō 
kikan) (including individuals in the business of news reporting).”
 Opposition political parties united to present their own alternative set of bills to the Diet. 
Key provisions would ban the collection and use of especially sensitive information such as 
political opinions and religious beliefs, would remove oversight authority from individual 
ministries to a new “information protection council” to be established under the Cabinet Of-
fice, and would require government agencies to notify that body when they use personal infor-
mation for a purpose different from the purpose for which it was originally collected.  But the 
government could safely disregard these proposals.  Its concessions to the establishment news 
media had effectively silenced criticism from that quarter and the ruling parties had the votes 
to override opposition in the Diet.  
 The government’s decision to exclude “magazine publishers” from the list of news or-
ganizations exempt from coverage drew criticism.95  The national newspapers and other big 
media organizations that enjoy membership in Japan’s exclusive “press clubs” and other 
privileges need not worry about dealing with requests for information from targets of their 
investigations or otherwise falling afoul of the new information system due to their reporting 
activities.  But the same could not be said of other organizations that serve important roles in 
fostering public debate in a democratic society.
 The weekly magazines are without doubt the element of Japan’s journalistic community 
most feared by politicians.  As we have seen, the judges moved quickly to raise libel awards 
in order to quiet this especially noisy sector of the press.  Now it appeared that the legislature 
made a special point of excluding magazine publishers from the express list of news organiza-
tions exempt from the law.96  The magazines would have to rely on the general language ex-
empting “other news reporting agencies.”
 This in turn led to another issue for the lawyers.  For the first time in its postwar his-
tory, Japan’s national legislature had crafted a definition for the term “news reporting.”  There 
would be no exemption related to individual information gathered in the process of writing 
95　See Reiji Yoshida, “Magazines to fight on over new privacy laws,” The Japan Times, May 24, 2003, and 
“Shūkanshi nado kankyō kibishiku,” (“Dire circumstances for the weekly magazines and others”) Nihon 
Keizai Shimbun, April 1, 2004.
96　See Yoshida, id.  Under ordinary rules of statutory interpretation, a specific list of entities exempt from 
a general rule implies that organizations not so specified are not exempt.  So the items left out were as 
significant as those included.
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material that does not qualify as “news reporting.” (hōdō)  Article 50 of the law defined news 
reporting to mean the gathering and dissemination of 
…objective facts described as facts to an unspecified and large number of persons (includ-
ing opinions and analysis (kenkai) based on such facts).
 The “unspecified and large number of persons” requirement would appear to exclude 
publications sent to members of civil society groups, e-mail lists, RSS feeds, and other means 
of issuing reports to a defined group of persons.  The “objective fact” requirement could surely 
lead to other problems.  Did the law mean that government was now in the position of final 
arbiter of the facts?  What about reports that challenge the official version of the “facts”?  As 
the segment of Japan’s news media most frequently in conflict with political leaders and other 
newsworthy figures, editors of the weekly magazines might think again before challenging of-
ficial versions of the “facts.”
 The law has surely created new administrative responsibilities for grass roots and other 
civil society organizations that seek to build broad memberships.97  Any such organization with 
the potential to build a contact list of more than a few thousand persons would now be required 
to maintain staff and systems necessary to comply with all aspects of the new personal infor-
mation protection regime.  The bar associations and other professional associations were also 
denied exemptions, so they would have to meet all requirements of the new regime concerning 
information of members or other individuals they gather. 
Epilogue
 Japan’s establishment news media may have escaped direct coverage of the law, but once 
the law was in place, mainstream reporters would complain that it acted to restrict newsgath-
ering anyway.  The first blockbuster news story to follow implementation of the Act was the 
2005 crash of a speeding passenger train near Osaka that killed more than one hundred people. 
By then everyone in Japan had become highly sensitized to risks of releasing “personal infor-
mation.”  According to one report, 
　　Suddenly reporters found themselves facing a wall of silence.  Many hospitals 
refused to divulge the names of the dead and injured.  Reporters explained their ex-
emption from the privacy law, but many hospital officials were not convinced.  And 
many bereaved family members refused to answer questions, citing the privacy law 
as grounds, one network executive said.98
 Fear of exposure of personal information has mushroomed into a national mania.  A new 
97　For a description of the many obstacles to development of non-governmental organizations that address 
inportant issues of national policy, see Robert Pekkanen, “Molding Japanese Civil Society: State Struc-
tured Incentives and the Patterning of Civil Society,” in Frank J. Schwartz and Susan J. Pharr, eds., The 
State of Civil Society in Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
98　“Write and Wrong: Some Reporters are being hindered by new privacy,” Asahi Shimbun (Eng. online 
ed.), Oct. 5, 2005.
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phrase to describe this problem, “Anonymous Society” (tokumei shakai) began to appear in the 
news media.  In 2006, the Yomiuri Shimbun even ran an investigative series that continued for 
several months under that title.
 Meanwhile the fear that state-of-the-art information banks portend expanded government 
power over individuals and less freedom is unchanged.  With the battle to stop implementation 
of Juki Net lost, the combatants moved their confrontation to the courts.  Several groups of 
plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Juki Net system, primarily on the ground that 
it violates a right of privacy they say is guaranteed by Japan’s Constitution.99
 The intense opposition to the system that led to acts of civil disobedience by local gov-
ernments led to some confusion in the courts as well.  For example, on Monday, May 30 and 
Tuesday, May 31, 2005, two district courts reached opposite conclusions on the matter.  In a 
suit filed by 28 residents of Ishikawa Prefecture, a panel of Kanazawa District Court granted 
the plaintiffs’ demand for an order to delete their information from Juki Net.100  On the follow-
ing day, a panel of Nagoya District Court rejected an identical request by 13 residents of Aichi 
Prefecture.101  The plaintiffs’ attorneys complained that the court avoided the constitutional 
issue altogether.  News reporters eagerly quoted the Kanazawa court statement “If the resident 
file code number is used as a master key to collect information, various information for each 
resident can be accumulated in an instant and leave such resident in a condition similar to be-
ing completely naked before an administrative agency.”102
 Although it seems unlikely that opponents of the system will ever gain an ultimate victory 
in the Supreme Court, litigation has long been a powerful weapon in the battle to shape public 
opinion in Japan.  Disputes over such questions as the definition of “news reporting” and ac-
cess to information in government databases, and demands for limits on government use of 
personal information are likely to occupy Japan’s courts long into the future.103 
99　Many scholars find privacy protection in Article 13, which declares that “All of the people shall be re-
spected as individuals.  Their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it 
does not interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other gov-
ernmental affairs.”
100　“Court: Juki Net violates privacy,” Asahi Shimbun (Eng. ed.), May 31, 2005.
101　“Nagoya Court: Info on Juki Net lawful,” Asahi Shimbun, June 1, 2005.
102　“Court: Juki Net violates privacy,” Asahi Shimbun (Eng. ed.), May 31, 2005.
103　Individuals who assert that government officials have infringed their rights generally have standing to 
sue for damages under the State Redress Law.  Thus, for example, a writer who claimed that his rights had 
been violated by Self-Defense Agency officials who investigated his use of the information disclosure act 
was awarded a nominal sum of financial damages in Tokyo District Court. 1171 Hanrei Times 204 (May 
1, 2005)
